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Abstract
Technical analysis, or the forecasting of asset price movements using past prices, is
commonly practiced in financial markets but poorly explained by mainstream economic
theory. I show that a technical rule can have predictive power when an asset’s payoffs
are subject to Knightian uncertainty, defined as variation that cannot be described
probabilistically (Knight, 1921). I present an asset-pricing model in which asset payoffs
undergo periodic shifts in trend, and agents form expectations about these payoffs
using a constant gain least squares (CGLS) rule. I investigate whether a second CGLS
rule, operating on price, can provide a more accurate forecast of payoffs during the
periods following a trend shift. I estimate the model using corporate earnings data
from the S&P 500, and present simulation results that show support for the usefulness
of technical analysis. Because technical analysis may influence the behavior of asset
markets, this finding has potential implications for investment, risk management and
financial policy.
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1

Introduction

A commonly observed behavior in asset markets is the use of technical analysis, defined by
Park and Irwin (2007) as “a forecasting method of price movements using past prices, volume, and open interest.” Surveys find that the vast majority of financial professionals report
using technical analysis (Taylor and Allen, 1992; Oberlechner, 2001; Menkhoff, 2010), despite hostility from mainstream economic and financial theory. The two dominant paradigms
in economics and finance, rational expectations theory and the Efficient Markets hypothesis, assert that asset prices should reflect all available information - in which case technical
analysis will not be predictive. Burton Malkiel famously wrote in A Random Walk Down
Wall Street (1973) that “technical strategies are usually amusing, often comforting, but of
no real value,” and forty years later, irrationality remains the most common explanation
put forward in the academic literature for the use of technical analysis (Menkhoff and Taylor, 2007). Nevertheless, empirical studies over the last three decades have generally shown
technical rules to be profitable (Park and Irwin, 2007). Additionally, a number of economic
models have been put forward in which the presence of technical traders is used to explain
other important phenomena, such as bubbles and busts in equity markets. Technical trading
may affect investment returns, economic outcomes, and policymaking decisions; and so it
would be useful if we could say why, and under what conditions, this behavior is likely to
occur. In this thesis, I hypothesize that technical analysis is a response to informational
constraints. I construct an asset-pricing model in which traders lack probabilistic knowledge
about an asset’s future payoffs - a condition often referred to as Knightian uncertainty - and I
show through model simulations that a simple technical rule can be predictive in this setting.
The concept of non-probabilistic uncertainty was first introduced in an economic context
by Frank Knight in Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit (1921). Knight distinguished between
variation in economic outcomes that can be described probabilistically, or risk, and the unforeseeable and ‘uncertain’ changes in technology and taste that take place in an evolving
economy. He suggested that entrepreneurs earn economic profit as a reward for contending
with the latter. Similarly, John Maynard Keynes attributed cyclical investment activity to
the “outstanding fact” of “the extreme precariousness of the basis of knowledge on which
our estimates of prospective yield have to be made,” and the role that confidence plays in
determining how individuals respond to this limitation (Keynes, 1936 12.iii). Uncertainty
implies that asset prices will depend not only upon information about an asset’s payoffs, but
also upon how that information is interpreted, and the confidence that market participants
3

place in their interpretation. In this context, technical analysis may, as suggested by its
practitioners, reveal something about “the changing attitudes of investors toward a variety
of economic, monetary, political, and psychological forces” (Pring, 2002).
To test this hypothesis, I construct an asset pricing model in which agents do not know
the probability distribution of future dividends, but instead learn about dividends using
statistical or ‘adaptive’ expectations. This approach is suggested by Evans and Honkapohja
(2001) for models with incomplete information, but is nevertheless a departure from rational
expectations theory, which requires that agents have full information about the model they
inhabit. Economic change is introduced to this model in the form of a stochastic process
of dividends that alternates periodically between states of expansion and contraction. I estimate this model using S&P 500 earnings data provided by Shiller (2015), as well as the
individual earnings data of four S&P 500 components: Microsoft, GE, Exxon and Johnson &
Johnson. I run simulations to test whether technical analysis - modeled as adaptive expectations about price - offers additional predictive power in periods following a state shift. The
results support my hypothesis. Technical analysis is predictive for a wide range of parameter
values, and performs better as the amount of Knightian uncertainty in the model increases.
The main contribution of this thesis is that it provides a generalizable explanation for the
use of technical analysis. Although a handful of researchers have studied the link between
technical trading, learning and uncertainty (Joshi et al, 2000; Zhu and Zhou, 2009), I present
a broader framework that involves fewer behavioral assumptions. In the model I construct,
all agents employ the same learning mechanism; they only differ in whether they choose to
learn about dividends or about price. This consistency suggests that a different learning
mechanism would produce similar results. Moreover, since there already exist a number of
studies on the measurement of macroeconomic uncertainty, this thesis points the way towards empirical analyses that might further establish (or reject) the proposed relationship
between technical trading and uncertainty. The theoretical model and results I discuss here
should be seen merely as an initial test, and as a proof-of-concept for additional research
that may benefit investors, financial institutions and policymakers.
The structure of this thesis is as follows. In Section 2 I discuss the literature on technical analysis and uncertainty. I develop a model in section 3, with estimation and simulation
results given in section 4. In section 5, I discuss results and present conclusions.
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2
2.1

Literature Review
Technical Analysis

Technical analysis is widely practiced in financial markets. An early survey by Smidt (1965)
found that more than half of amateur traders in US commodity markets rely moderately to
heavily on analysis of price charts. Brorsen and Irwin (1987) documented similar prevalence
amongst advisory groups for large public futures funds, with more than half reporting heavy
use of technical trading systems. A landmark study by Taylor and Allen (1992) found that
90% of London-based foreign exchange dealers employ some form of technical analysis - a
number subsequently confirmed by Oberlechner (2001) - and Menkhoff (2010) found likewise
that 87% of international fund managers rely on technical strategies to at least some extent.
With respect to foreign exchange markets, Menkhoff and Taylor (2007) list three stylized
facts: that technical analysis is widely used by professional traders, that it is typically used
in conjunction with fundamental analysis (i.e. forecasts based upon an asset’s expected payoffs), and that its use increases at short time horizons.
Evidence indicates that technical strategies may be profitable. While early studies such
as Fama and Blume (1966) were inconclusive, research since the late 1980’s has documented
profitability both in equity markets (Brock et al, 1991; Taylor, 2000) and in foreign exchange
markets (Sweeney, 1986; Neely et al, 1997). A meta-analysis by Park and Irwin (2007) found
that 58 of 92 studies conducted in the last three decades have shown technical rules to be
profitable and/or predictive. Indeed, the annual revenues of U.S.-based high frequency trading - much of it technical in nature, or based upon non-price sentiment indicators (Manzoor,
2013) - were estimated at $5 billion by Brogaard et al (2014) for the years 2008-2009. With
respect to profitability, Menkhoff and Taylor (2007) offer an additional set of stylized facts.
Technical analysis in currency markets may be profitable even after transaction and interest
rate costs are taken into account, profitability tends to increase with exchange rate volatility, and the performance of any given technical rule is unstable over time. The relationship
between volatility and technical profits is suggestive, insofar as volatility has also been found
to correlate with political or economic uncertainty in equity markets (see for instance Bittlingmayer, 1998).
The prevalence and profitability of technical analysis is difficult to explain from a theoretical standpoint. Rational expectations theory and the Efficient Markets hypothesis both
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assert that prices incorporate all available information, and represent the best forecast of an
asset’s future performance. If this is true, then technical analysis should not provide any
additional predictive power. Consequently, “the charge of not-fully-rational behaviour on the
part of those applying technical analysis is probably the most common position in explaining its use” (Menkhoff and Taylor, 2007). Three other common explanations include central
bank intervention, slow diffusion of market news, and the presence of other technical traders
(ibid). However, technical analysis predates modern central banking in the U.S. (Dow theory
originated in the 19th century), its use has been robust to changes in information technology,
and a zero-sum game would imply that up to 90% of professional traders are risk seeking.
A larger problem is that these explanations are non-unique and non-general. They describe
idiosyncratic circumstances under which prices will convey information, whereas technical
analysis is a robust phenomenon that would seem to require a more general mechanism.
Although technical analysis yet lacks a general explanation, it has proven useful in explaining the poor empirical performance of standard asset-pricing theories. For instance,
Shiller (1981) demonstrates that real-world stock prices exhibit “excessive volatility,” and
Poterba and Summers (1988) present evidence that stock prices are mean reverting, and not
a random walk as supposed by theory. De Long et al (1990) find that these anomalies can
be caused by “noise traders” who “get their pseudosignals from technical analysts, stockbrokers, or economic consultants and irrationally believe that these signals carry information.”
Similarly, Lux and Marchesi (1998) show that a market with technical traders can produce
temporally clustered volatility, matching the observed tendency for stock market volatility
to show up in ‘waves.’
By explaining the use of technical analysis, we might better understand its effect upon asset
prices, better predict when this effect will be significant, and better account for any implications that technical analysis presents for asset-pricing theory and economic policy. There are
several papers in the academic literature that analyze technical analysis in a similar framework to the one presented in this thesis. Joshi et al (2000) simulate a heterogeneous agent
model with learning, and find that technical analysis is a dominant strategy. Zhu and Zhou
(2009) analyze the performance of moving average trading rules and find that, while they
are not generally optimal, they may perform better than fundamental analysis when traders
are uncertain about the correct model of asset payoffs. However, both papers rely on highly
specified models, and they do not directly address the relationship between uncertainty and
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technical analysis. To explain technical trading as the result of a learning process or a state
of mind, is to replace an observable anomaly with an unobservable phenomenon. Such an
explanation can offer few testable predictions. On the other hand, if technical trading is a
response to a specific informational problem, which might be analyzed or measured directly,
then we should be able to predict when this behavior will occur.

2.2

Knightian Uncertainty

Non-probabilistic (or ‘Knightian’) uncertainty played a major role in the work of two pre-war
economists, Frank Knight and John Maynard Keynes. Knight (1921) defined uncertainty as
“the degree of subjective confidence felt in [a] contemplated act as a correct adaptation to
the future” (p.242), and suggested that entrepreneurs earn economic profits as a reward for
contending with and specializing in “the uncertainty which is involved in a changing world”
(p.147). Similarly, Keynes (1936) argued that “investment based on genuine long-term expectation is so difficult today as to be scarcely practicable” (12.v), and that investment
decisions consequently depend upon confidence, or “how highly we rate the likelihood of our
best forecast turning out quite wrong” (12.ii). The common insight appears to have been
that, while we might construct models of the economy that assign probabilities to events,
we do not typically possess probabilistic knowledge about whether these models are correct.
Market behavior may depend upon the amount of ‘confidence’ attached to market forecasts,
and if forecasting models are judged based upon their empirical performance - as is typically
done in the sciences - then the state of confidence may vary over time and in response to
changes in economic data.
Neither economist developed uncertainty into a tractable theory. Knight‘s analysis was
“lacking in formal clarity” (Arrow, 1951), whereas Keynes believed that there is “not much
to be said about the state of confidence a priori” (Keynes, 1936 12.ii). Moreover, it was
difficult to reconcile uncertainty with the theoretical traditions of equilibrium analysis and
expected utility, which assume that behavior is fixed and that outcomes have objective
probabilities. The concept of uncertainty nevertheless played an important role in post-war
macroeconomics. Macroeconomic models of the 1950’s and 60’s tended to be heavily statistical in nature, reflecting economists’ lack of confidence in their mechanical understanding
of the broader economy, and agents within these models were also assumed to have statistical or ‘adaptive’ expectations. The adaptive expectations approach represented a “clear-cut
conflict” (Lucas, 1976) with economic theory, and one that was eventually resolved with the
7

widespread adoption of rational expectations theory. Rational expectations imposes the restriction that, within an economic model, “the conditional expectation operator is consistent
with the probability law that governs the actual data generation” (Hansen, 2014). In other
words, agents within a probabilistic model have probabilistic expectations. While internally
consistent, this approach rules out uncertainty, and it implies that agents do not face the
same informational constraints - the same issue of confidence - as the economist, policymaker
or market participant who built the model.
Although adaptive expectations was found to be a poor macroeconomic framework, it may
nevertheless provide what Knight and Keynes did not: a way to model uncertainty in theoretical settings. This possibility has received considerable attention in recent years. Evans
and Honkapohja (2001) propose an adaptive learning approach to modeling, in which agents
are not presumed to have “full knowledge of the structure of the model” or “the values of
the parameters,” but rather to“act like statisticians or econometricians when ... forecasting
about the future state of the economy” (p.12). Cogley and Sargent (2005) posit that central
banks are “adaptive decision makers” subject to model uncertainty, and that economic data
not only informs each of the models that central bankers use, but influences as well the
confidence assigned to the different models. Hansen (2014) proposes an empirical approach
to asset pricing in which “a researcher does not specify formally [the probability law that
governs the actual data generation] and instead ‘lets the data speak’.” Similarly, Frydman
and Goldberg (2013) offer a model of asset prices in which some variables are left unspecified, to reflect the fact that “participants revise their forecasting strategies” as news becomes
available.
Why does any of this matter with respect to technical trading? The broad answer is that,
given Knightian uncertainty, prices may convey information about the forecasting models
used by market participants. If these models (or their parameters) are chosen based upon
empirical performance, then they will vary in response to changes in asset payoffs, and this
learning process may introduce persistent trends into price movements. In other words, technical analysis may allow one to “guess better than the crowd how the crowd will behave”
(Keynes, 1936 12.v). This intuition has some grounding in the literature. Zhang (2006) finds
that short-term price momentum is correlated with informational uncertainty, or ambiguity
regarding “the implications of new information for a firm’s value,” suggesting that learning
may produce momentum in prices. Lawson (1980) shows that, given adaptive expectations
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about inflation, “higher order” learning rules can be optimal when the inflation rate changes
in non-constant fashion. A higher-order learning rule means, essentially, that agents are
learning about the learning process. Returning to a point made in the previous section,
uncertainty can potentially explain the stylized facts offered by Menkhoff and Taylor (2007):
the correlation between technical profits and volatility, the time-varying nature of technical
rule performance, and their greater use at short time horizons. Finally, there exists a sizable
literature on the measurement of uncertainty using variation in economic indicators (Jurado
et al, 2013) and the dispersion of analyst forecasts (Anderson et al, 2009; Barron et al, 2010),
suggesting that a connection between uncertainty and technical analysis can be empirically
tested.

3

Model

In this section I construct an asset-pricing model with the goal of testing, in a theoretical
setting, the hypothesis that technical analysis is predictive under Knightian uncertainty. An
asset-pricing model usually includes two elements: a stochastic process describing asset payoffs, and a ‘pricing kernel’ that translates future payoffs into present prices. To introduce
uncertainty into such a model, I make two critical assumptions. First, I assume that agents
do not know the parameters of the underlying stochastic process, but must form statistical
estimates of these parameters. Second, in order to ensure that uncertainty is persistent, I
assume that the model parameters change over time, and that agents remain ignorant of the
“law of the change” (Knight, 1921 p.37). In other words, agents are not aware of all of the
variables affecting asset payoffs, and they possess only imperfect information about those
variables that they are aware of.
The model is constructed as follows. First, I define a stochastic process representing the
dividends paid by a risky asset. I then define three prices: the ‘true price’ indicated by
the stochastic process, the ‘fundamental price’ indicated by agents’ expectations about the
stochastic process, and the ‘technical price’ indicated by agents’ expectations about prices.
Since the fundamental and technical prices are both estimates of the true price, we can measure the relative accuracy of the technical price, and we can test whether its performance
correlates with changes in the model parameters. Thus, this model may allow us to test the
hypothesis that technical analysis is predictive under Knightian uncertainty.

9

3.1

Stochastic Process

In order to construct the model outlined above, we require a stochastic process with timevarying parameters. One of the simplest models satisfying this description is a Markovswitching stochastic process, in which one (or several) of the parameters in a simple linear
model is made to depend upon an underlying ‘state’ variable. The state variable is assumed
to follow a Markov process, meaning that its value in any given period depends only upon
its value in the preceding period - an assumption that allows us to control the persistence of
each state. Studied in-depth by Hamilton (1989), Markov-switching processes are a relatively
simple way to characterize time series data that move in repetitive, well-defined trends, such
as data influenced by the business cycle. These models have been used successfully to describe macroeconomic variables such as GDP (Kim et al, 2005) and equity returns (Guidolin
and Timmerman, 2005).
I assume that there exists an asset whose dividends are given by a Markov-switching process
with two states: an expansionary state (state one), and a contractionary state (state two).
This stochastic process is described by the following set of equations:
Yt
= ast + t , t ∼ N (0, σ 2 )
Yt−1
!
p11 p12
P =
p21 p22

(1)

pij = P (st = j | st−1 = i) ,
where Yt /Yt−1 is the slope of the dividend at period t, and ast ∈ {a1 , a2 } is a trend coefficient conditional on the state variable st ∈ {s1 , s2 }. The transition probabilities for the state
variable are given by the matrix P, where pij ∈ [0, 1] indicates the probability that st = sj
given that st−1 = si . The random variable or ‘innovation’ t is assumed to be independent
and identically distributed. These equations state that the period-to-period change in asset
dividends is determined by two components: a random component, and a trend component
whose value varies over time.
Hamilton (1989) provides a probabilistic filter for estimating the value of the state variable in any period, given knowledge of the model’s parameters and information on all past
dividends. Knightian uncertainty precludes agents from using this filter, but it is required
for the model estimation performed in section 4, and so I describe it here. Hamilton gives
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three equations:
ŝj,t|t−1 =

2
X

pij si,t|t−1

(2)

i=1

ηj,t =

1
p
2
2πσ 2 Yt−1

!
e

−(Yt −aj Yt−1 )2
2σ 2

(3)

P2

pij si,t|t−1 ηj,t
,
P2
p
s
η
ij
j,t
i,t|t−1
i=1
j=1

ŝj,t = P2

i=1

(4)

where (2) is the ‘predicting’ equation, or the estimated probability that st = j given dividend
values up to period t−1, and (4) is the ‘updating’ equation, or the estimate of this probability
using dividend values up to period t. In equation (3), ηj,t indicates the probability density
of dividend values at time t, conditional on st = j. Model estimation is discussed in greater
detail in section 4.

3.2

Fundamental Rule

For reasons discussed at the beginning of this section, I assume that agents are ignorant of
the ‘state’ variable described above. They form expectations about future asset dividends
using the equation
Yt
= at + t , t ∼ N (0, σ 2 ) ,
Yt−1

(5)

where at varies over time and must be statistically estimated. For situations such as this,
where agents form adaptive expectations about a stochastic process with time-varying parameters, Sargent (1999) suggests using a constant gain least squares (CGLS) rule, which
gives greater weight to more recent observations. For the trend coefficient at in (9), a CGLS
rule is given by the equations
E[at ] = ât = ât−1 + λF Yt−1

Yt − ât−1 Yt−1
Rt

2
Rt = Rt−1 + λF (Yt−1
− Rt−1 ) ,

(6)
(7)

where λF ∈ [0, 1] is the weight or ‘gain’ placed on the most recent observation. A higher
gain means that the estimate ât will adjust more quickly to changes in the true parameter
ast , but that it will also be more volatile due to the randomness imposed by t . I will refer
to this estimate as the ‘fundamental rule.’
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For derivation of price, I assume for simplicity that agents are risk neutral. I assume also
that E[Yt+1 ] = ât Yt and E[ât+1 ] = ât , or that agents form expectations using all of the
information (and only the information) available to them. Finally, I assume that the price
at time t is simply the present value of future dividends, with discount rate k. We therefore
have the pricing equation:
PtF =

E[Yt+1 ]
1+k

+

E[Yt+2 ]
(1+k)2

+ ... +

E[Yt+n ]
(1+k)n

+ ...
(8)

=

P∞

E[Yt+i ]
i=1 (1+k)i

.

Substituting (5) and (6) into this equation, we have
P∞ ât i
PtF =
i=1 ( 1+k ) Yt
=

Yt
,
ât
1 − 1+k

(9)

provided that |ât | < (1 + k). If this condition is not true, and |ât | ≥ (1 + k), then the
summation in (9) will not be a geometric series and it will yield an infinite or an undefined
value. This is an important caveat, because it limits the values that we can assign to the
discount rate k. I hereafter refer to PtF as the ‘fundamental price’.

3.3

Technical Rule

In the previous section I defined the fundamental rule and, from that rule, I derived the
fundamental price. Note that this price will have a slope, equal in expected terms to the
slope of dividends. That is,
F
E[Pt+1
]=

E[Yt+1 ]
1−

E[ât+1 ]
1+k

=

ât Yt
= ât PtF .
ât
1 − 1+k

(10)

Note additionally that price can be represented, like dividends, as a stochastic process of the
form given in (3):
PtF
= bt + θt , θt ∼ N (0, σθ2 ) .
F
Pt−1

(11)

Equation (10) shows that we could use the fundamental rule ât as an estimate of the slope
of price, or bt . However, we can also estimate bt directly by using the CGLS equations given
in (4) and (5), such that
F
E[bt ] = b̂t = b̂t−1 + λT Pt−1

F
PtF − b̂t−1 Pt−1
Qt

F 2
Qt = Qt−1 + λT ([Pt−1
] − Qt−1 ) .
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(12)
(13)

We therefore have a second adaptive expectation with gain λT , which treats price as a
stochastic process and forms estimates about the period-to-period change in prices. I will
F
refer to this expectation as the ‘technical rule.’ Note that E[Pt+1
] = ât PtF = b̂t PtF , showing

that each of the CGLS rules gives the expected slope of price. However, the estimates given
by these two rules will differ, insofar as b̂t will depend upon variation in ât , as well as upon
variation in the underlying dividend. This can be seen by substituting (9) into (12):
!
2
b̂t Yt−1
(1 + k)2
λT
Yt Yt−1 (1 + k)2
b̂t = b̂t−1 +
−
.
Qt (1 + k − ât−1 )(1 + k − ât ) (1 + k − ât−1 )2

(14)

If ât is not equal to ât−1 , then in general b̂t will not be equal to ât . When the two rules have
equal gains, b̂t will tend to vary more than ât . Whether this increased variation brings with
it increased predictive power will depend upon whether changes in ât are due to randomness,
or due to a change in the model parameters - that is, to a state shift.
From b̂t we can derive a second, technical price:
PtT =

Yt
1−

b̂t
1+k

.

(15)

I hypothesize that, following a state shift, the technical price will be a more accurate indicator
than the fundamental price of the true present value of future dividends. To compare the
two prices, I will make reference to a third price, given not by the estimates ât or b̂t but by
the true parameter value ast :
Pt∗ =

Yt
ast .
1 − 1+k

(16)

This ‘true price’ provides a benchmark by which we might measure the accuracy of the
fundamental and technical rules as predictors of future dividends, thereby determining the
relative performance of the technical rule.

4

Results

To test the model just described, we require parameter values for the stochastic process
{a1 , a2 , σ, P11 , P22 }, the discount rate k, and the gains of the two CGLS rules {λ̂F , λ̂T }. The
approach I take in this section is as follows. I estimate the stochastic process using S&P 500
monthly Earnings-Per-Share (EPS) data provided by Shiller (2015), as well as quarterly EPS
for four S&P 500 components: Microsoft, Exxon, General Electric and Johnson & Johnson.
13

Estimation is performed by maximizing the model log-likelihood with the Broyden-FletcherGoldfarb-Shanno algorithm, a numerical approximation method; the model log-likelihood is
the summation over all periods of the log of the denominator in (4). Using these estimates, I
examine technical rule performance for different values of the fundamental and technical gain.
Specifically, I run a 100×100 grid of model simulations, each with N = 5000 periods, in which
the fundamental and technical gains range from 0 to 1 in .01 increments. The performance
of the technical rule is measured as the mean absolute percentage error (MAPE) of the
fundamental price PtF as a predictor of the true price Pt∗ , minus the MAPE of the technical
price PtT :
M AP EF − M AP ET =

N
X
|PiF − Pi∗ | − |PiT − Pi∗ |
.
∗
N
×
P
i
i=1

(17)

I report two general findings. First, for a significant range of gain values, the technical
rule outperforms the fundamental rule in the periods following a shift in the state variable.
Second, this outperformance is persistent over time and is robust to changes in parameter
values, suggesting that the technical rule could be employed profitably by the agents in this
model. However, these results are affected by the discount rate k, a free parameter. In order
to address this shortcoming, in section 4.3 I characterize results under alternative discount
rates.

4.1

S&P 500 Monthly Earnings

Here I estimate the model presented in section 3 using CPI-adjusted S&P 500 monthly EPS
data provided by Shiller (2015). Data span the period from January 1871 to March 2015.
However, a problem encountered during estimation is that the large decline in earnings
for the S&P 500 during the 2007-08 financial crisis tends to dominate the time series, so
that instead of trends corresponding to economic expansion and recession, we obtain trends
corresponding to normal market conditions and financial crises. Since my goal in using
index-wide earnings data is to examine the ‘typical’ performance of the technical rule, I wish
to avoid any variation due to the financial crisis. Consequently, I limit model estimation to
earnings data from the twentieth century (January 1901 to December 2000). Technical rule
performance under more extreme conditions is addressed in section 4.2, where I estimate the
model using individual corporate EPS.
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Table 1: Parameter estimates for S&P 500 monthly EPS

Parameter

Estimate

Std. Error

a1

1.015

.0012

a2

0.985

.0013

σ

0.018

.0004

p11

0.955

.0100

p22

0.947

.0012

Compared to the null hypothesis of a linear (non-switching) model, the Markov-switching
model from section 3 provides a good fit for monthly S&P 500 earnings. A likelihood ratio
test, which compares the log likelihood values of the two models, yields a p-value < .0001.
The performance of the technical rule is presented graphically in Figure 1, measured over
three-month intervals beginning with the first month following a state variable shift. Darker
areas indicate values of the fundamental and technical gain for which the technical price
produces a lower MAPE than does the Fundamental MAPE - that is, where the technical
rule has predictive power.
With the model estimates in table 1 and a discount rate of k = .2, the technical rule
demonstrates predictive power for a wide range of fundamental and technical gain values. For
‘reasonable’ values of the fundamental gain (between .05 and .4)1 , technical rule performance
is strongest in the months immediately following a state shift, supporting the hypothesis.
For high values of the fundamental gain, this relationship is reversed; the fundamental rule
adjusts quickly to state shifts, but performs worse over time than does a technical rule
with a low gain. However, this second result requires both unreasonably high values of the
fundamental gain, and a significant disparity between the fundamental and technical gains.
For more reasonable gain values with less disparity, the hypothesis holds: technical rule
performance correlates with Knightian uncertainty, as indicated by the recency of a state
shift.
1

For the model estimates presented in this thesis, ‘optimal’ fundamental gains range from .17 to .36, with

standard errors no greater than .009. Although Knightian uncertainty rules out such optimization, these
figures nevertheless indicate a ‘reasonable’ range of gain values.
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Figure 1: Technical Rule Performance, S&P 500 Monthly EPS
MAPEF − MAPET

1.0
0.8

0.6

0.03

0.6

0.03

0.02

0.4

0.02

0.01

0.2

0.01

0.00

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

Technical Gain

1.0
0.8

0.04

0.4

Technical Gain

0.04

0.0

0.05

0.0

1.0

0.00
0.0

0.2

Fundamental Gain

MAPEF − MAPET

0.6

0.8

1.0

MAPEF − MAPET

1.0

0.8

0.04

0.8

0.04

0.6

0.03

0.6

0.03

0.4

0.02

0.4

0.02

0.01

0.2

0.01

0.00

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

Technical Gain

1.0

0.05

0.2

Months 10 − 12

0.05

0.0

Technical Gain

0.4

Fundamental Gain

Months 7 − 9

1.0

0.00
0.0

0.2

Fundamental Gain

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

Fundamental Gain

MAPEF − MAPET

MAPEF − MAPET

1.0
0.8

0.04

0.6

0.03

0.6

0.03

0.02

0.4

0.02

0.01

0.2

0.01

0.00

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

Technical Gain

1.0
0.8

0.04

0.0

0.05

0.4

Months 16 − 18

0.05

0.2

Months 13 − 15

Technical Gain

MAPEF − MAPET

Months 4 − 6

0.05

0.2

Months 1 − 3

0.00
0.0

Fundamental Gain

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

Fundamental Gain

Figure 1: Technical rule performance in the months following a state shift, using S&P 500 monthly earnings.
Darker areas indicate gain values where the technical rule outperforms the fundamental rule.
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4.2

Corporate Quarterly Earnings

To examine how different model parameters affect technical rule performance, in this section
I estimate the Markov-switching model using quarterly EPS for four of the five2 largest
components of the S&P 500 stock index: Microsoft, Exxon, General Electric and Johnson
and Johnson. I obtain data from Compustat, beginning in Q1 1962 for Exxon and GE, Q1
1963 for Johnson and Johnson, and Q3 1984 for Microsoft. All time series end in Q2 2015.
I present this data graphically in figure 2.
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Figure 2: Log EPS for Exxon, GE, J&J and Microsoft

Because the Hamilton filter described in section 3.1 cannot handle outliers or large ‘jumps’ they introduce division by zero into equation (4) - the data required smoothing before model
estimates could be obtained. I found that a four-quarter moving average did not sufficiently
eliminate breaks in the data, so instead I used the annual growth rate of earnings, measured
quarterly. Model estimates are presented in table 2.
Table 2: Parameter estimates for corporate quarterly EPS

Exxon

GE

J&J

Microsoft

Parameter

Estimate

Error

Estimate

Error

Estimate

Error

Estimate

Error

a1

1.084

.012

1.016

.003

1.029

.003

1.081

.005

a2

0.986

.006

0.834

.018

0.887

.012

0.967

.009

σ

0.047

.003

0.043

.002

0.040

.002

0.038

.003

p11

0.839

.054

0.985

.009

0.984

.009

0.930

.028

p22

0.945

.012

0.771

.003

0.785

.003

0.834

.005

p-value

2

< .0001

< .0001

< .0001

The volatility of Apple earnings prevented me from obtaining a model estimate.
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< .0001

Likelihood ratio tests yield a p-value < .0001 in all four cases, when compared against the
null hypothesis of a linear model. The EPS of each company exhibits an expansionary and
a contractionary trend. For Microsoft and Exxon, the difference between these trends is
relatively mild, and is indicative of the kind of business cycle variation discussed in section
4.1. Note that in Exxon’s case, the expansionary trend is less persistent than the expansionary trend, reflecting the characteristics of the oil industry. On the other hand, earnings
for GE and Johnson & Johnson are characterized by a more severe, but less persistent contractionary trend, reflecting the influence of the financial crisis on GE’s performance, and of
product recalls (as in 2010) on that of J&J.

Figure 3: Technical Rule Performance, Corporate Quarterly EPS
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Figure 3: Technical rule performance in the four quarters following a state shift, using corporate EPS
data. Darker areas indicate gain values where the technical rule outperforms the fundamental rule. Note
the difference in scales.
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Figure 3 shows that the technical rule has considerably greater predictive power in the case
of GE and J&J. Also visible is the effect of the larger standard deviation (σ) of Exxon
earnings relative to Microsoft earnings, and the narrower spread between trends for J&J
when compared to GE. Overall, technical rule performance tends to improve as the standard
deviation of earnings decreases, or as the difference between two trends widens - in other
words, as state shifts account for more of the variation in earnings.

4.3

Alternative Discount Rates

The simulations in previous sections use the discount rate k = .2. This value was chosen
to be sufficiently high that the pricing equations described in section 3 would yield wellbehaved (i.e. finite) values. Although the fundamental rule ât can have a value no greater
than the larger trend coefficient plus the innovation variable, and no less than the smaller
trend coefficient minus the innovation, the technical rule can potentially be much larger since
it also takes into account variation in ât . Because there exists a vertical asymptote in the
technical price as b̂t approaches k, this nonlinearity can affect the MAPE of the technical
price when compared to the fundamental price. In order to characterize the effect of a change
in the discount rate on technical rule performance, I simulate S&P 500 monthly earnings for
months 1-3 and 4-6 as in section 4.1, but instead I use the discount values k = .1 and k = .3.
Results are presented in figure 3.
All else equal, a higher discount rate tends to flatten results, giving the technical rule predictive power over a wider range of gain values, but reducing the magnitude of that predictive
power. Note that for a lower discount rate, a low-gain technical rule no longer outperforms
a high-gain fundamental rule. Although I argued in section 4.1 that results in this portion
of the graph require unreasonable gain values, the explanation for this change is nevertheless informative. As the discount rate becomes smaller, the impact of a state shift on price
becomes relatively greater, resulting in a general increase in the MAPE of a technical rule
with a low gain, relative to the MAPE of a fundamental rule with a high gain.
Overall, a change in the discount rate does not significantly affect previous results. Rather,
it reflects a tradeoff: a higher discount rate means that the technical rule is less likely to be
predictive, but that it will have a larger advantage over the fundamental rule in cases where
it is predictive.
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Figure 4: Alternative Discount Rates, S&P 500 Monthly EPS
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Figure 4: Technical rule performance in the months following a state shift, using S&P 500 monthly earnings.
Darker areas indicate gain values where the technical rule outperforms the fundamental rule. Note the
difference in scales.

5

Conclusion

The results in section 4 show that, for a wide range of parameter values, the technical rule has
predictive power in the periods following a state shift. This predictive power is persistent,
suggesting that the gains offered by the technical rule are exploitable. The relationship
between model parameters and technical rule performance can be characterized as follows:
i) For plausible values of the fundamental gain, technical rule performance is strongest in
the periods immediately following a state shift.
ii) The predictive power of the technical rule tends to be more persistent over time for low
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values of the fundamental and technical gains - that is, when agents learn slowly.
iii) A decrease in the standard deviation, and/or an increase in the absolute difference
between the two trend coefficients, tends to increase the predictive power of the technical
rule relative to the fundamental rule.
iv) An increase in the discount rate tends to expand the range of gain values for which the
technical rule is predictive, but reduces the predictive power of the technical rule within
that range.
Generalizing these results, we can say that technical rule performance improves as the
Markov-switching process becomes more influential - that is, as Knightian uncertainty increases. These results therefore lend support to the hypothesis that, given Knightian uncertainty, a ‘rational’ investor might choose to employ technical analysis.
Some caveats are in order when interpreting this evidence. First, while it is common in
economics to test hypotheses in theoretical models, such models can only assess whether a
hypothesis is internally consistent and theoretically plausible. Empirical research is needed
to determine whether the model predictions are consistent with economic data. Thus, while
this thesis represents a first step in testing the relationship between technical analysis and
uncertainty, it represents a first step only. Second, I make strong assumptions about the
informational constraints facing agents: that they have neither perfect information about,
nor a perfect theoretical understanding of asset payoffs. While I argue that these assumptions are realistic, they are nevertheless at odds with rational expectations theory. Third,
simulation results show that technical rule performance is conditional upon the value of the
fundamental and technical gains. Even if we make the limiting assumption that all agents
learn at the same rate, or λF = λT , there will still exist a large range of gain values for which
technical analysis is not predictive. Thus, while results indicate that technical analysis can
be useful, they do not require it. Fourth, technical rule performance may depend upon the
choice of CGLS for the model in section 3, as opposed to some other statistical method for
estimating model parameters. Finally, the fundamental price is an input for the technical
rule, but this price could only be observable if no traders were using the technical rule. In
other words, the use of technical analysis may adversely affect its performance. The goal of
this thesis was to investigate whether technical analysis is a reasonable behavior a priori, but
this leaves open the important question of what happens once technical traders are present.
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If technical analysis is predictive under Knightian uncertainty, then several implications follow. From the point of view of investors, there may be circumstances where it is normative to
take technical considerations into account - contradicting the advice offered by mainstream
asset-pricing theories. From the standpoint of financial institutions, who typically have regulatory and fiduciary duties to monitor their risk exposure, a better understanding of the
role of uncertainty in driving ‘anomalous’ market behavior may allow these institutions to
better hedge or protect themselves against extreme market conditions. Similarly, knowledge
of any relationship between technical analysis and uncertainty may assist policymakers in
designing efficient policy, and in overseeing the operations of financial institutions. With
respect to economic theory, if it can be shown that uncertainty is responsible for a major
behavioral phenomenon, then there may be a greater impetus to study the kind of informational constraints discussed here, and to consider them when building economic models.
In conclusion, this thesis provides a framework for studying the relationship between uncertainty and technical analysis, and theoretical evidence in favor of the hypothesis that such a
relationship exists. The next step would be to test whether this relationship is empirically
supported. Does short-term asset price momentum correlate with higher variance in analyst
forecasts? Does price volatility increase when economic data is subject to greater noise? The
results presented here suggest that these questions may be worth answering. More broadly,
this thesis is an investigation into how we might explain or even predict anomalous behavior
in asset markets, by considering the informational constraints facing market participants
and the uncertainty caused by these constraints. Understanding such behavior allows us
to better assess market risk, to better design robust institutions and policy, and to better
reconcile theory with observation. Ultimately, asset traders and economic models face the
same challenge: surviving unforeseen events and market crises. With increased knowledge
of the relationship between uncertainty and asset prices, market participants and economic
forecasters may be better able to meet that challenge.
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Appendix: R Code
# This function compares the performance of a technical rule and a fundamental rule after
# a regime switch, by solving for the difference between their mean average percentage error
# for all gain values in (0,1) in .01 increments. Results are exported to a file "Data.csv".
# The function takes as input the length of the random walk, and the first and last periods
# of the region after a regime shift over which to average results. Setting primer = "on"
# avoids coordinates that yielded extreme values in the previous trial, reducing computation
# time. Note that the first 100 periods are cut off when computing results.
library("plot3D")
fundtech <- function(walklength, testbegin, testend, primer = "off") {
# Model Parameters
rfrate <- .20 # Risk-free interest rate; low values may cause erratic price behavior
stdev <- .018 # Innovation standard deviations as a fraction of value
# Regime Parameters
pmatrix <- matrix(c(.955, .053, .045, .947), 2, 2) # Transition matrix
regimes <- c(1, 2) # Regime index
divtrend <- c(1.015, .985) # Dividend drift as a fraction of value
# Initial Conditions
initialseed <- 1 # Starting random seed
initialregime <- 1 # Starting regime
initialvalue <- 1 # Starting dividend
initialexpdivtrend <- sum(divtrend)/2
initialexppricetrend <- sum(divtrend)/2
# Execution Loop
cutoff <- -.2
results <- matrix(-.05, nrow = 100, ncol = 100)
if(primer == "on") results <- as.matrix(read.table("Data.csv"))
for(fundgain in 1:100) for(techgain in 1:100) if(results[fundgain,techgain] > cutoff) {
regime <- initialregime
set.seed(initialseed)
# Generate Random Vectors
innovation <- rnorm(walklength - 1)
switch <- sample(1:1000, walklength - 1, replace = TRUE)
for(i in 2:walklength) {
for(j in 1:2) {
if(regime[i-1] == regimes[j]) if(switch[i-1] <= pmatrix[j, j]*
1000) regime[i] <- regimes[j] else regime[i] <-
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regimes[regimes != j]
}
}
# Generate Value and True Price Vectors
value <- initialvalue
trueprice <- vector()
for(i in 2:walklength) value[i] <- divtrend[regime[i]]*value[i-1] +
stdev*value[i-1]*innovation[i-1]
for(i in 1:walklength) trueprice[i] <- value[i]*(1 + rfrate)/(1 +
rfrate - divtrend[regime[i]])
# Fundamental Price Vector
# Least Squares Equations
expdivtrend <- vector(); expdivtrend[1] <- initialexpdivtrend
expdivvar <- vector(); expdivvar[1] <- 1
for(i in 2:walklength){
expdivvar[i] <- expdivvar[i-1] + (fundgain/100)*(value[i-1]^2 expdivvar[i-1])
expdivtrend[i] <- expdivtrend[i-1] + (fundgain/100)*value[i-1]*(value[i] value[i-1]*expdivtrend[i-1])/expdivvar[i]
}
# Fundamental Price Vector
fundamentalprice <- vector()
for(i in 1:walklength) fundamentalprice[i] <- value[i]*(1 +
rfrate)/(1 + rfrate - expdivtrend[i])
# Technical Price
# Least Squares Equations
exppricetrend <- vector(); exppricetrend[1] <- initialexppricetrend
exppricevar <- vector(); exppricevar[1] <- 1
for(i in 2:walklength){
exppricevar[i] <- exppricevar[i-1] + (techgain/100)*
(fundamentalprice[i-1]^2 - exppricevar[i-1])
exppricetrend[i] <- exppricetrend[i-1] + (techgain/100)*
fundamentalprice[i-1]*(fundamentalprice[i] fundamentalprice[i-1]*exppricetrend[i-1])/exppricevar[i]
}
# Technical Price Vector
technicalprice <- vector()
for(i in 1:walklength) technicalprice[i] <- value[i]*(1 + rfrate)/(1 + rfrate -
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exppricetrend[i])
# Generate Mean Absolute Percentage Error Matrix
switchperiods <- vector() # Periods in which a regime shift occurs
for(i in 101:(walklength-testend)) for(j in 1:2) {
if(regime[i-1] == regimes[j]) if(switch[i-1] > pmatrix[j, j]*
1000) switchperiods = c(switchperiods, i)
}
mape <- matrix(0, nrow = 2, ncol = length(switchperiods)) # MAPE matrix
for(i in 1:length(switchperiods)) {
for(j in 1:(1+testend-testbegin)) {
mape[1,i] <- mape[1,i] + abs((fundamentalprice[switchperiods[i]-2+j+
testbegin] - trueprice[switchperiods[i]-2+j+testbegin]))/
(trueprice[switchperiods[i]-2+j+testbegin]*(1+testend-testbegin))
mape[2,i] <- mape[2,i] + abs((technicalprice[switchperiods[i]-2+j+
testbegin] - trueprice[switchperiods[i]-2+j+testbegin]))/
(trueprice[switchperiods[i]-2+j+testbegin]*(1+testend-testbegin))
}
}
# Generate test statistic, move random seed and print update
results[fundgain, techgain] <- mean(mape[1,]) - mean(mape[2,])
initialseed <- initialseed + 1
if(initialseed %% 100 == 0) print(paste(initialseed/100,"% complete.", sep = ""))
}
# Save Data File
write.table(results, file = "Data.csv")
}

# This function fits a two-regime Markov switching model to the data supplied, tests against
# the null hypothesis of a linear model using a likelihood ratio test, and reports the
# parameters of the two models, their log likelihoods, and the p-value for the likelihood
# ratio test.
mkestimate <- function(datavector){
# Initial estimates <- c(coeff1, coeff2, stdev, p11, p22)
initialparameters <- c(1.08, .98, .03, .98, .9) # Initial guess
# Initial null estimates <- c(coeff, stdev)
initialnullparameters <- c(1.01, .05)
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# Fit the Markov switching models and return the log likelihood value
loglikelihood <- function(parameters) {
pmatrix <- matrix(c(parameters[4], 1-parameters[5], 1parameters[4], parameters[5]), 2, 2)
# Hamilton Filter
density <- array(0, dim = c(2, length(datavector)))
jointconddensity <- array(0, dim = c(2, 2, length(datavector)))
update <- array(0, dim = c(2, length(datavector))); update[,1] <- c(.5,.5)
for(i in 2:length(datavector)) {
for(k in 1:2) density[k, i] <- (1/(sqrt(2*pi)* abs(parameters[3]*
datavector[i-1])))*exp((-(datavector[i] - parameters[k]*
datavector[i-1])^2)/(2*(parameters[3]*datavector[i-1])^2))
for(j in 1:2) for(k in 1:2) jointconddensity[j, k, i] <- pmatrix[j, k]*
update[j, i-1]*density[k, i]
for(k in 1:2) update[k, i] <- sum(jointconddensity[, k, i]) /
sum(jointconddensity[,,i])
}
loglikelihood <- 0
for(i in 2:length(datavector)) loglikelihood <- loglikelihood +
log(sum(jointconddensity[,,i]))
return(-loglikelihood)
}
# Fit the null model and return the log likelihood value
nullloglikelihood <- function(nullparameters) {
parameters <- c(nullparameters[1],nullparameters[1],nullparameters[2],1,1)
pmatrix <- matrix(c(parameters[4], 1-parameters[5], 1parameters[4], parameters[5]), 2, 2)
# Hamilton Filter
density <- array(0, dim = c(2, length(datavector)))
jointconddensity <- array(0, dim = c(2, 2, length(datavector)))
update <- array(0, dim = c(2, length(datavector))); update[,1] <- c(.5, .5)
for(i in 2:length(datavector)) {
for(k in 1:2) density[k, i] <- (1/(sqrt(2*pi)*abs(parameters[3]*
datavector[i-1])))*exp(-((datavector[i] - parameters[k]*
datavector[i-1])^2)/(2*(parameters[3]*datavector[i-1])^2))
for(j in 1:2) for(k in 1:2) jointconddensity[j, k, i] <- pmatrix[j, k]*
update[j, i-1]*density[k, i]
for(k in 1:2) update[k, i] <- sum(jointconddensity[, k, i]) /
sum(jointconddensity[,,i])
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}
loglikelihood <- 0
for(i in 2:length(datavector)) loglikelihood <- loglikelihood +
log(sum(jointconddensity[,,i]))
return(-loglikelihood) # Negative because optim() minimizes
}
estimate <- optim(initialparameters, loglikelihood, method = "L-BFGS-B", hessian =
TRUE, lower = c(.9,.5,.02,.01,.01), upper = c(1.5,1.2,.5,1,1)) # BFGS optimize
nullestimate <- optim(initialnullparameters, nullloglikelihood, method =
"L-BFGS-B", hessian = TRUE, lower = c(.8, .02), upper = c(1.2, .2))
error <- sqrt(diag(solve(estimate$hessian))) # Standard errors from (neg) Hessian
nullerror <- sqrt(diag(solve(nullestimate$hessian)))
lratiostat <- 2*(nullestimate$value - estimate$value) # $value * (-1) = loglikelihood
lratiotest <- 1-pchisq(lratiostat, 3) # Calculate likelihood ratio test P-value
# Report
rpar <- round(estimate$par, 4); rnullpar <- round(nullestimate$par, 4)
rvalue <- round(-estimate$value, 4); rnullvalue <- round(-nullestimate$value, 4)
rerror <- round(error, 4); rnullerror <- round(nullerror, 4)
print(paste("Coefficient 1:", rpar[1], ", SE =", rerror[1], sep = " "))
print(paste("Coefficient 2:", rpar[2], ", SE =", rerror[2], sep = " "))
print(paste("Standard Deviation:", rpar[3], ", SE =", rerror[3], sep = " "))
print(paste("P11:", rpar[4], ", SE =", rerror[4], sep = " "))
print(paste("P22: ", rpar[5], ", SE =", rerror[1], sep = " "))
print(paste("Log likelihood value of", rvalue, "with convergence =",
estimate$convergence, sep = " "))
print(paste("Null Coefficient:", rnullpar[1], ", SE =", rnullerror[1], sep = " "))
print(paste("Null Standard Deviation:", rnullpar[2], ", SE =", rnullerror[2], sep =
" "))
print(paste("Null log likelihood value of", rnullvalue, "with convergence =",
nullestimate$convergence, sep = " "))
print(paste("Likelihood Ratio Test P-value:", lratiotest, sep = " "))
}

# This function finds the optimal fundamental gain for the Markov-switching model
# using the BFGS algorithm.
mkoptimize <- function(walklength = 5100, seed = 1) {
initialparameter <- .2 # Initial guess
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mape <- function(fundgain) {
# Model Parameters
rfrate <- .20 # Risk-free interest rate; low values may produce N/A’s
stdev <- .018 # Innovation standard deviations as a fraction of value
# Regime Parameters
pmatrix <- matrix(c(.955, .053, .045, .947), 2, 2) # Transition matrix
regimes <- c(1, 2) # Regime index
divtrend <- c(1.015, .985) # Percent dividend trend under regimes 1 and 2
# Initial Conditions
set.seed(seed) # Random seed
regime <- 1 # Starting regime
initialvalue <- 1 # Starting dividend
initialexpdivtrend <- sum(divtrend)/2
initialexppricetrend <- sum(divtrend)/2
# Generate Random Vectors
innovation <- rnorm(walklength - 1)
switch <- sample(1:1000, walklength - 1, replace = TRUE)
for(i in 2:walklength) {
for(j in 1:2) {
if(regime[i-1] == regimes[j]) if(switch[i-1] <= pmatrix[j, j]*
1000) regime[i] <- regimes[j] else regime[i] <regimes[regimes != j]
}
}
# Generate Value and True Price Vectors
value <- initialvalue
trueprice <- vector()
for(i in 2:walklength) value[i] <- divtrend[regime[i]]*value[i-1] +
stdev*value[i-1]*innovation[i-1]
for(i in 1:walklength) trueprice[i] <- value[i]*(1 + rfrate)/(1 +
rfrate - divtrend[regime[i]])
# Least Squares Equations
expdivtrend <- vector(); expdivtrend[1] <- initialexpdivtrend
expdivvar <- vector(); expdivvar[1] <- 1
for(i in 2:walklength){
expdivvar[i] <- expdivvar[i-1] + (fundgain)*(value[i-1]^2 - expdivvar[i-1])
expdivtrend[i] <- expdivtrend[i-1] + (fundgain)*value[i-1]*(value[i] -
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value[i-1]*expdivtrend[i-1])/expdivvar[i]
}
# Fundamental Price Vector
fundamentalprice <- vector()
for(i in 1:walklength) fundamentalprice[i] <- value[i]*(1 +
rfrate)/(1 + rfrate - expdivtrend[i])
# Mean Absolute Percentage Error
pe <- 0
for(i in 101:walklength) pe <- pe + abs((fundamentalprice[i] trueprice[i]))/(trueprice[i]*(walklength-100))
return(pe)
}
# Compute average optimized value with standard error
length <- 50
results <- rep(0, times = length)
for(i in 1:length) {
estimate <- optim(initialparameter, mape, method = "L-BFGS-B", lower =
.01, upper = 1, hessian = TRUE) # Optimization using BFGS)
results[i] <- estimate$par
seed <- seed + 1
}
avg <- mean(results)
stderr <- 0
for(i in 1:length) stderr <- stderr + ((results[i] - avg)^2)/(length-1)
stderr <- sqrt(stderr)/sqrt(length-1)
# Report
print(paste("Optimal Gain:", avg, sep = " "))
print(paste("Standard Error: ", stderr, sep = " "))
}
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